Despite Russia waging its war of aggression in Ukraine, some actors in Western democracies continue to excuse the actions of the Russian government and military. In Germany, the far-right contributes to disseminating the Russian discourses regarding the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and, therefore, can be considered part of the Russian continuous soft power to destabilize Western democratic societies.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the German response to it
February 24, 2022 is considered to be the beginning of the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine, a violent culmination of the Russian hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine started in early 2014. Appalled by Russian military atrocities, the global community sharply reacted to the Russian aggression in Ukraine. More than 140 countries condemned the invasion. Germany was among those countries. The German government and civil society en masse declared its support for Ukraine and imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia. Nevertheless, several actors from different sides of the political spectrum denounced the German government’s response to the Russian invasion and even justified Russia’s actions. For instance, the German far-right criticized disciplinary measures against Russia and condemned the EU’s military support of Ukraine to facilitate its self-defense. By delegitimizing German and EU governments, the far-right also justified the Russian invasion and disseminated Russian propaganda.
Acknowledging the general concern regarding the European far-right as a sort of the Kremlin’s trojan horse, for example, through disseminating Russia’s war discourses, this piece focuses specifically on the statements by far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) that justified the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Before covering the AfD’s dissemination of Russian propaganda, I briefly introduce Russia’s official discourses regarding its invasion of Ukraine. I conclude by indicating destabilizing impacts of the insertion of Russian propaganda into Western societies’ liberal architecture.
Russia sacralizes its invasion of Ukraine
Putin’s address to the Russian nation on February 24, 2022, and the Kremlin’s texts following it, contributed to the construction of the Russian official discourses, which sacralized the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a “civilizing task” of the Russian nation. These discourses covered two polarizing topics: (1) the heroization of the Russian nation and (2) the aggressive antagonization of Russia’s alleged adversaries. Being further disseminated by Russian political parties and in the state-controlled media landscape, these discourses aimed at manipulating the opinion of the Russian population and spreading state propaganda,leading to their significant support by the Russian population and their acceptance by some populations abroad.
First, the Russian state claimed that Russia allegedly protected its “fraternal” people in Ukraine. Second, the narrative suggested that the Russian “special military operation” was a forced measure to protect some, allegedly threatened, Russian national interests. Lastly, the Russian state reinforced narratives about Russian strength and, despite this, alleged readiness for a diplomatic compromise “for the sake of the world.” This “compromise,” however, suggested an unacceptable “peace” on Russian terms, including Russia’s absolute control of Ukraine (claimed as “neutral status”) and the world’s recognition of Russia’s illegitimate expropriation of the Crimean peninsula and occupied Eastern Ukrainian territories.
On the other hand, the Russian state employed discriminatory discourse to antagonize its alleged adversaries. This was expressed in the following narratives: First, the Kremlin claimed that Ukraine’s government and army allegedly originated from their Ukrainian “Nazi” predecessors and were Western and predominantly Anglo-Saxon “tools” in their centuries-long imperialist fight against “sovereign Russia.” Second, this antagonization relied on the populist narration suggesting that “Western elites” lied to their people, framing their intentions as “corrupt interests” supposedly focused on pleasing the US. Lastly, Russian nationals who publicly condemned the Russian invasion and supported Ukraine were derogatorily portrayed through the Kremlin’s “fifth column” conspiracy. This conspiracy singled out purportedly “national traitors” who allegedly “sold themselves” for Western goods and comfort and acted in Western interests.
Justification of the invasion by far-right AfD
The aforementioned discourses did not find support in Western democracies, and were condemned as Russian disinformation. Nevertheless, not every actor in Western democratic societies condemned the Russian aggression. The German far-right party AfD was exemplary for the European far-right parties connected to the Russian political milieu in its justification of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Already before its beginning, because of its sympathizing and collaborating with the Russian state, AfD was described as a party of Russlandversteher [“understanders of Russia”; in the German public discourse, this term is attributed to actors taking an apologetic position towards the Russian authoritarian state].
Despite AfD’s denomination of the invasion as the russischer Angriffskrieg [Russian war of aggression], which nominally excluded its complete parroting of the Russian discourses and sacralization of Russia’s aggression, the party still justified Russia’s military actions against Ukraine. First, the AfD manipulated the collective remembrance regarding the defeat of Nazi Germany during World War II. Specifically, the party minimized the contribution of Western countries in combating Nazism, in some instances attributing victory to Russia. This was projected to the contemporary context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine: the AfD implied that the West could be defeated again in Ukraine due to supposed Russian strength. This echoed two of Russia’s narratives mentioned above: Russia being strong and Russia’s cornerstone narrative regarding the alleged existential foreign (predominantly Western) threat to Russia.
Second, the AfD did not condemn the Russian invasion as an unprovoked aggression. Instead, the AfD reproduced further Russian narratives suggesting that Russia was compelled to respond to the “Western attack” on Russian sovereignty through the phony narrative of NATO’s expansion eastwards. Additionally, here, the AfD repeated Russian propaganda claiming that the German government was acting against German interests and executing the “will” of the US. Furthermore, former AfD leader Alexander Gauland spread Russia’s discursive strategies of nuclear blackmail, claiming that the EU sanctions and German weapon delivery could escalate the conflict in Ukraine to a nuclear World War III. With this antagonization of the German government and its actions regarding the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the AfD also amplified people’s insecurity regarding the energy concerns and economic issues, which arose in Germany because of the Russian invasion. Interestingly, some AfD politicians even participated in Russian propagandist TV shows as “experts” suggesting the alleged economic downfall of the EU and other consequences of the “profane” mistakes of their leaders.
Finally, several narratives in the AfD’s party publications focused on antagonizing the Ukrainian government and persons living in Ukraine, including Ukrainian refugees in the EU. First, the AfD accused the Ukrainian government of being corrupt, and of discriminating against the Russian-speaking population in the country. Such anti-Ukrainian propaganda was also essential to the Russian official discourse regarding the “special military operation.” Lastly, despite acknowledging white Ukrainian nationals as “temporary refugees,” the AfD also reinforced zero-sum storytelling, suggesting that the German government treated them as a “privileged group,” characterized by the AfD as an injustice towards the German people. Unsurprisingly, non-white Ukrainian residents seeking refuge in Germany were portrayed by the AfD as “illegal migrants” abusing the “Ukrainian conflict” to enter the EU, which can be considered a standard discursive topic for the far-right.
Takeaways from the dissemination of the Russian propaganda by the AfD
Overall, this piece illustrates how Russian propaganda has been disseminated in the democratic German society after Russia’s unprecedented violence against Ukraine. The Russian invasion of Ukraine heralded, on the one hand, broad solidarity with Ukraine and unity of democratic societies against Russian atrocities. On the other hand, it was possible to observe the continuous spread of Russian propaganda by some oppositional actors, including the German far-right. This illustrates that the destabilizing potential of the Russian state is still effective, to some degree, outside of the Russian borders, representing a continuous threat to the liberal democratic architecture of Western societies. Among the identified by the scholars, “the export of corruption and kleptocratic networks, economic pressures in the energy sector,” such destabilizing impacts include disinformation campaigning and creating political supporters in the face of the European far-right that, as illustrated by the AfD, reverberates, to some extent, the Russian official discourse regarding the invasion. By showcasing the destructive potential of the European far-right by, e.g. opposing Western governments at all costs, even if it means endorsing a warmongering Russian dictator, this piece provides additional insights on the continuous Russia’s soft-power and its spread of desinformation through some European far-right parties even amidst the Russian uncovered perpetrations in Ukraine.
Polina Zavershinskaia is a FRAN Fellow and a Doctoral Student at the Institute for Political Science of Leipzig University.
